Abstract:
Somalia has been without a functioning central government since January 1991, when the military regime collapsed and civil war among clan militias broke out. During the subsequent decade, de facto decentralization of political power largely along clan lines has occurred, with varying degrees of territorial control achieved by militia leaders and local administrations in different areas of the country. The study focuses on the factors and dynamics at play in the Somalia conflict by determining the escalators or de-escalators of violence in the Somali conflict. Main methodology employed is the collection of material from secondary sources. The study's findings are that the Somali civil war is neither a traditional war nor a byproduct of East-West competition in the Horn of Africa, though the two dimensions have played varying roles at different times, It is a modern conflict that has been fed by a long list of grievances against the state, its policies, its ruling elite and its clients. Its roots are in the blockages of the command economy that the Siad Barre government attempted to impose on the country after the coup in October 1969, its reluctant and partial move toward economic liberalization in the 1980s while at the same time attempting to use state levers to maintain political control, its growing reliance on a small group of family, sub-clan and business associates to run the country and its intensified policy since 1978 of 'divide and rule' towards clans, regions and business interests. While none of these moves proved successful for the country in the long term, they sowed such deep divisions in the country that it was only after a decade and a half of civil war and strife that a reconciliation conference, the fourteenth, succeeded in electing a broad-based national government, the Transitional Federal Government in 2004.