EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF MORAL HAZARD IN NIGERIAN HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME

The grant difference of lifestyle indices which constitute moral hazard

discussed between other ministries who hold health insurance policy and ministry

of Justice who don’t is significant (75). If I have health insurance that takes care of

my bills, then I have less incentives to invest in maintaining my health because

when I get sick the financial consequences will be borne by someone else,

therefore, I am going to eat, smoke more, drink more, exercise less and be merry. I

am going to choose to consume more medical services because the price of

medical care is low. This makes the demand for health price sensitive. The lower

the price, the more the consumption Amy Finkelstein (2015).

In this case, we reject null hypothesis and accept alternate hypothesis- that

there is a significant difference in health care utilization between the treatment

group (other ministries) and the controlled group (ministry of Justice).

With the aforementioned, we can therefore, conclude that there a moral

hazard in the Nigerian health insurance market, evident in the risky lifestyle

behavior of our ramdomised sample drawn from different ministries of Nasarawa

state