Is Non-Reductive Physicalism A Plausible Theory Of Consciousness?

ABSTRACT According to the non-reductive physicalist, mental properties are not identical to physical properties. In order to distinguish non-reductive physicalism from epiphenomenalism, the non-reductive physicalist considers mental properties as not just a by-product of physical processes but posits that mental properties can cause physical events thereby violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. The problem which this thesis seeks to investigate, therefore, is that, if physicalism suggests that the only reality is the physical kind and that all other things including the mental depend on the physical domain then is the position of the non-reductive physicalist with respect to the independence of mental properties and their causal powers consistent with physicalism? I posit in this thesis that nonreductive physicalism is a plausible theory of consciousness by clarifying concepts such as monism, physical, physicalism and materialism. I also assert the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism by showing that non-reductive physicalism upholds the principle of the causal closure of the physical against Kim’s (1993) criticism that it does not.